REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:

The government has filed a petition for en banc rehearing. The en banc petition remains pending. This court supplements its opinion entered on petition for panel rehearing to reaffirm that, under Texas law, section 481.112(a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code is indivisible and "establishes alternative means of punishing an offense in the continuum of drug distribution." Weinn v. State, 326 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see United States v. Tanksley, 848 F.3d 347, 352 (5th Cir. 2017). We reached this conclusion based on Lopez v. State, 108 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). In urging the en banc court to rehear the case, the government argues our holding "is clearly inconsistent with Guerrero v. State, 305 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), which controls the issue and holds that manufacturing and possessing with intent to deliver a controlled substance are separate offenses." The government's argument is misguided because it is drawn from a plurality opinion. Weinn makes clear that Guerrero never upset Lopez. Weinn, 326 S.W.3d at 193 (footnotes omitted) (explaining that, in Guerrero, the "majority, comprised of two concurring judges and three dissenting judges, noted that the legislature did not intend multiple punishments for manufacture and simultaneous possession with intent to deliver with respect to a single quantity of controlled substances."). Without a doubt, Weinn "definitively" establishes that Section 481.112 is an indivisible statute. See Mathis v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 2256, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016).1